We present a simple, new paradigm for the design of collision-free hash functions. Any function emanating from this paradigm is incremental. This means that if a message x which I h a v e previously hashed is modi ed to x 0 then rather than having to re-compute the hash of . Also any function emanating from this paradigm is parallelizable, useful for hardware implementation.
then rather than having to re-compute the hash of x 0 from scratch, I can quickly update" the old hash value to the new one, in time proportional to the amount of modi cation made in x to get x 0 . Also any function emanating from this paradigm is parallelizable, useful for hardware implementation.
We derive several speci c functions from our paradigm. All use a standard hash function, assumed ideal, and some algebraic operations. The rst function, MuHASH, uses one modular multiplication per block of the message, making it reasonably e cient, and signi cantly faster than previous incremental hash functions. Its security is proven, based on the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem. A second function, AdHASH, is even faster, using additions instead of multiplications, with security proven given either that approximation of the length of shortest lattice vectors is hard or that the weighted subset sum problem is hard. A third function, LtHASH, is a practical variant of recent lattice based functions, with security proven based, again on the hardness of shortest lattice vector approximation.
1 Introduction A collision-free hash function maps arbitrarily long inputs to outputs of a xed length, but in such a way that it is computationally infeasible to nd a collision, meaning two distinct messages x; y which hash to the same point. 1 These functions were rst conceived and designed for the purpose of hashing messages before signing, the point being to apply the expensive signature operation only to short data. Whence the collision-freeness requirement, which is easily seen to beanecessary condition for the security of the signature scheme. Although this remains the most important usage for these functions, over time many other applications have arisen as well. Collision-free hash functions are now w ell recognized as one of the important cryptographic primitives, and are in extensive use.
We are interested in nding hash functions that have a particular e ciency feature called incrementality" which w e describe below. Motivated by this we present a new paradigm for the design of collision-free hash functions. We obtain from it some speci c incremental hash functions that are signi cantly faster than previous ones.
It turns out that even putting incrementality aside, functions resulting from our paradigm have attractive features, such as parallelizability.
Incremental Hashing
The idea. The notion of incrementality was advanced by Bellare, Goldreich and Goldwasser BGG1 . They point out that when we cryptographically process documents in bulk, these documents may be related to each other, something we could take advantage of to speed up the computation of the cryptographic transformations. Speci cally, a message x 0 which I w ant to hash may be a simple modi cation of a message x which I previously hashed. I f I h a v e already computed the hash fx o f x then, rather than re-computing fx 0 from scratch, I would like to just quickly update" the old hash value fx to the new value fx 0 . An incremental hash function is one that permits this.
For example, suppose I want to maintain a hash value of all the les on my hard disk. When one le is modi ed, I do not want to re-hash the entire disk contents to get the hash value. Instead, I can apply a simple update operation that takes the old hash value and some description of the changes to produce the new hash value, in time proportional to the amount o f c hange.
In summary, what we want is a collision-free hash function f for which the following is true. Let x = x 1 : : : x n be some input, viewed as a sequence of blocks, and say block i is modi ed to x 0 i . Let x 0 be the new message. Then given fx; i ; x i ; x 0 i it should be easy to compute fx 0 .
Standard constructions fail. Incrementality does not seem easy to achieve. Standard methods of hash function construction fail to achieve it because they involve some sort of iteration. This is true for constructions based on block ciphers. For description of these constructions see for example the survey PGV . It is also true for the compression function based constructions that use the Merkle-Damg ard meta-method Me, Da2 . The last includes popular functions like MD5 Ri , SHA-1 SHA and RIPEMD-160 DBP . The modular arithmetic based hash functions are in fact also iterative, and so are the bulk of number-theory based ones, eg. Da1 . A thought that comes to mind is to use a tree structure for hashing, as described in Me, Da2 . Adjacent blocks are rst hashed together, yielding a text half the length of the original one, and then the process is repeated until a nal hash value is obtained. One is tempted to think this is incremental because if a message block is modi ed, work proportional only to the tree depth needs to be done to update. The problem is you need to store the entire t r e e , meaning all the intermediate 1 The formal de nition in Section 2 speaks of a family of functions, but we dispense with the formalities for now.
hash values. What we want is to store only the nal hash value and beable to increment given only this. Past work. To date the only incremental hash function was proposed by BGG1 , based on work of CHP . This function is based on discrete exponentiation in a group of prime order. It uses one modular exponentiation per message block to hash the message. This is very expensive, especially compared with standard hash functions. An increment operation takes time independent of the message size, but also involves exponentiation, so again is expensive. We want to do better, on both counts.
The Randomize-then-combine Paradigm
We introduce a new paradigm for the construction of collision-free hash functions. The high level structure is quite simple. View the message x as a sequence of blocks, x = x 1 : : : x n , each block being b bits long, where b is some parameter to choose at will. First, each block x i is processed, via a function h, to yield an outcome y i . Speci cally, y i = hhii : x i where hii is a binary representation of the block index i and : " denotes concatenation. These outcomes are then combined" in some way to yield the nal hash value y = y 1 y 2 : : : y n , where denotes the combining operation."
Here h, the randomizing" function, is derived in practice from some standard hash function like SHA-1, and treated in the analysis as an ideal" hash function or random oracle BR . For completeness a brief discussion of this paradigm is provided in Appendix E. The combining operation is typically a group operation, meaning that we interpret y 1 ; : : : ; y n as members of some commutative group G whose operation is denoted .
We call this the randomize-then-combine paradigm. It is described fully in Section 3. The security of this method depends of course on the choice of group, and we will see several choices that work. The key bene t we can observe straight away is that the resulting hash function is incremental. Indeed, if x i changes to x 0 i , one can re-compute the new hash value as y hx i ,1 hx 0 i where y is the old hash value and the inverse operation is in the group. Also it is easy to see the computation of the hash function is parallelizable.
By choosing di erent groups we get various speci c, incremental, collision-free hash functions, as we n o w describe.
Notice that h needs itself to becollision-free, but applies only to xed length inputs. Thus, it can beviewed as a compression function." Like Me, Da2 , our paradigm can thus beviewed as constructing variable input length hash functions from compression functions. However, our construction is parallel" rather than iterative. It is important to note, though, that even though our constructions seem secure when h is a good compression function meaning one that is not only collision-free but also has some randomness properties the proofs of security require something much stronger, namely that h is a random oracle.
MuHASH and its Features
MuHASH. Our rst function, called MuHASH for multiplicative hash," sets the combining operation to multiplication in a group G where the discrete logarithm problem is hard. For concreteness, think G = Z p for a suitable prime p. In this case, hashing consists of randomizing" the blocks via h to get elements of Z p and then multiplying all these modulo p. Efficiency. How fast is MuHASH? The cost is essentially one modular multiplication per b-bit block. Notice that one computation of h per b-bit block is also required. However, the cost of computing h will usually be comparatively small. This is especially true if the block length is chosen appropriately. For example, if h is implemented via SHA, chosing b as a multiple of 512, the expensive padding step in computing SHA can beavoided and the total cost of computing h for every block is about the same as a single application of SHA on the whole message. The cost of h will be neglected in the rest of the paper.
At rst glance the presence of modular operations may make one pessimistic, but there are two things to note. First, it is multiplications, not exponentiations. Second, we can make the block size b large, making the amortized per-bit cost of the multiplications small. Thus, MuHASH is much faster than the previous incremental hash function. In fact it is faster than any number-theory based hash function we know. Note if hardware for modular multiplication is present, not unlikely these days, then MuHASH becomes even more e cient to compute.
The increment operation on a block takes one multiplication and one division, again much better than the previous construction.
Security. We show that as long as the discrete logarithm problem in G is hard and h is ideal, MuHASH is collision-free. This may seem surprising at rst glance since there does not seem to be any relation between discrete logarithms and MuHASH. In the latter we are just multiplying group elements, and no group generator is even present! That is, we show that if there is any attack that nds collisions in MuHASH then there is a way to e ciently compute discrete logarithms in G.
The strength of this statement is that it makes no assumptions about the cryptanalytic techniques used by the MuHASH attacker: no matter what these techniques may be, the attacker will fail as long as the discrete logarithm problem in G is hard. This proven security means we are obviated from the need to consider the e ects of any speci c attacks. That is, it is not necessary to have a n exhaustive analysis of a list of possible attacks.
The proven security provides a strong qualitative guarantee of the strength of the hash function. However, we have in addition a strong quantitative guarantee. Namely, we have reductions that are tight. To obtain these we h a v e to use the group structure more carefully. We present separate reductions, with slightly di erent c haracteristics, for groups of prime order and for the multiplicative group modulo a prime. These are Theorem 4.2 and Theorem 4.3 respectively. In practice this is important because it means we can work with a smaller value of the security parameter making the scheme more e cient.
An interesting feature of MuHASH is that its strength in practice" may greatly exceed its proven strength. MuHASH is proven secure if the discrete logarithm problem is hard, but it might be secure even if the discrete logarithm problem is easy, because we know of no attack that nds collisions even if it is easy to compute discrete logarithms. And in practice, collision-freeness of h seems to su ce.
AdHASH and its Features
AdHASH for additive hash" uses addition modulo a large enough integer M as the combining operation in the randomize-then-combine paradigm. In other words, to hash we rst randomize the blocks of the message using h and then add all the results modulo M.
Replacing multiplication by addition results in a signi cant improvement in e ciency. Hashing now only involves n modular additions, and the increment operation is just two modular additions.
In fact AdHASH is competitive with standard hash functions in speed, with the added advantages of incrementality and parallelizability.
AdHASH also has strong security guarantees. We show that it is collision-free as long as the weighted knapsack problem" which we de ne is hard and h is ideal. But Ajtai Aj has given strong evidence that the weighted subset sum problem is hard: he has shown that this is true as long as there is no polynomial time approximation algorithm for the shortest vector problem in a lattice, in the worst case. But even if this approximation turns out to be feasible which w e don't expect the weighted subset sum problem may still be hard, so that AdHASH may still be secure.
We also prove that AdHASH is a universal one-way hash function in the sense of Naor and Yung NY , assuming the subset sum function of IN1, IN2 is one-way and h is ideal. Thus, under a weaker assumption, we can show that a weaker form but still useful form of collision-freeness holds. We note our reductions here are tight, unlike those of IN1, IN2 . See Appendix D. In summary AdHASH is quite attractive both on the e ciency and on the security fronts.
Hashing from Lattice Problems
Ajtai introduced a linear function which i s p r o v ably one-way if the problem of approximating the Euclidean length of the shortest vector in a lattice is hard Aj . The function is matrix-vector multiplication, with particular parameters. Goldreich, Goldwasser and Halevi GGH observed that Ajtai's main lemma can beapplied to show that the function is actually collision-free, not just one-way. We observe that this hash function is incremental. But we also point out some impracticalities.
We then use our randomize-then-combine paradigm to derive a more practical version of this function. Our function is more e cient and has smaller key size. It is called LtHASH for lattice hash". The group is G = Z k p for some integers p; k, meaning we interpret the randomized blocks as k-vectors over Z p and add them component-wise. Assuming h is ideal the security of this hash function can be directly related to the problem underlying the security of Ajtai's one-way function Aj, GGH so that it is collision-free as long as the shortest lattice vector approximation problem is hard.
Note that the same assumption that guarantees the security of LtHASH namely hardness of approximation of length of the shortest vector in a lattice also guarantees the security of AdHASH, and the e ciency is essentially the same, so we m a y just stick with AdHASH. However it is possible that LtHASH has some features of additional interest, and is more directly tied to the lattice hardness results, so it is worth mentioning.
Attack on XHASH
Ideally, we would like to hash using only conventional" cryptography ie. no number theory. A natural thought i s t h us to set the combining operation to bitwise XOR. But we show in Appendix A that this choice is insecure. We present an attack on the resulting function XHASH, which uses Gaussian elimination and pairwise independence. It may be useful in other contexts.
We are loth to abandon the paradigm based on this: it is hard to imagine any other paradigm that yields incrementality. But we conclude that it may be hard to get security using only conventional cryptography to implement the combining operation. So we turned to arithmetic operations and found the above.
The balance problem
We identify a computational problem that can bede ned in an arbitrary group. We call it the balance problem. It turns out that consideration of the balance problem uni es and simpli es the treatment of hash functions, not only in this paper but beyond. Problems underlying algebraic or combinatorial collision-free hash functions are often balance problems. We will see how the hardness of the balance problem follows from the hardness of discrete logs; how in additive groups it is just the weighted subset sum problem; and that it captures the matrix kernel problem presented in Aj which is the basis of lattice based hash functions GGH .
The problem is simply that given random group elements a 1 ; : : : ; a n , nd disjoint subsets I ; J f 1 ; : : : ; n g , not both empty, such that J i2I a i = J j2J a j , where is the group operation. Having reduced the security of our hash function to this problem in Lemma 3.1, our main technical e ort will be in relating the balance problem in a group to other problems in the group.
Related Work
For a comprehensive survey of hashing see MVV, Chapter 9 . Discrete logarithm or factoring based functions. To the best of our knowledge, all previous discrete logarithm or factoring based hash functions which have a security that can be provably related to that of the underlying number theoretic problem use at least one multiplication perbit of the message, and sometimes more. For example this is true of the functions of Da1 , which are based on claw-free permutations GMR . In contrast, MuHASH uses one multiplication perb-bit block and can make b large to mitigate the cost of the multiplication. But MuHASH uses a random oracle assumption which the previous constructions do not. And of course the previous functions, barring those of BGG1 , are non-incremental. Collision-free versus universal one-way. Collision-freeness is a stronger property than the property of universal one-wayness de ned by Naor and Yung NY . Functions meeting their conditions are not necessarily collision-free. But they do su ce for many applications. Subset-sum based hashing. Impagliazzo and Naor IN1, IN2 de ne a hash function and prove that it is a universal one-way function which i s w eaker than collision-free as long as the subsetsum function is one-way. The same function is de ned in Da2, Section 4.3 . There it is conjectured to be collision-free as well, but no proof is provided. These functions have a k ey length as long as the input to be hashed very impractical and use one addition per bit of the message. In contrast, AdHASH has short key length and uses one addition per b-bit block of the message, and b can be made large.
Hashing by multiplying in a group. Independently of our work, Impagliazzo and Naor have also considered hashing by m ultiplying in a group. These results have been included in IN2 , the recent journal version of their earlier IN1 . In their setup, a list of random numbers a 1 ; : : : ; a n is published, and the hash of message x is Q n i=1 x i a i where x i is the i-th bit of x and the product is taken in the group. Thus there is one group operation per bit of the message, and also the key size is proportional to the input to behashed. Functions resulting from our paradigm use one group operation per b-bit block, which is faster, and have xed key size. On the security side, IN2 show that their hash function is universal one-way as long as any homomorphism with image the given group is one-way. In particular, if the discrete logarithm problem in the group is hard. In contrast we show that our functions have the stronger property o f being collision-free. But the techniques are related and it is also important t o note that we use a random oracle assumption and they do not. On the other hand our reductions are tight and theirs are not. The general security assumption of IN2 and their results provide insight i n to why MuHASH may be secure even if the discrete logarithm problem is easy. Modular arithmetic hash functions. Several iterative modular arithmetic based hash functions have been proposed in the past. These do not try to provably relate the ability to nd collisions to any underlying hard arithmetic problems. See Girault Gi for a list and some attacks. More recent in this vein are MASH-1 and MASH-2, designed by GMD Gesellschaft fur Mathematik im Dataverarbeitung and being proposed as ISO standards. However, attacks have been found by Coppersmith and Preneel CP . XOR MACs. Our paradigm for hashing is somewhat inspired by, and related to, the XOR MACs of BGR . There, XOR worked as a combining operation. But the goal and assumptions were di erent. Those schemes were for message authentication, which is a private key based primitive.
In particular, the function playing the role of h was secret, The key space KeysF has an associated probability distribution. When we want to pick a particular hash function from the family F we pick K at random from this distribution, thereby specifying FK;. The key K then becomes public, available to all parties including the adversary: these hash functions involve no hidden randomness.
In our constructions an ideal hash function" h is also present. We follow the paradigm of BR : In practice, h is derived from a standard cryptographic hash function like SHA, while formally it is modeled as a random oracle." The latter means h is initially drawn at random from some family of functions, and then made public. Parties have oracle access to h, meaning they are provided with a boxwhich, being queried with a point x, replies with hx. This is the only way h can be accessed. We stress the oracle is public: the adversary too can access h.
Formally, h will be viewed as part of the key de ning a hash function, and the random choice o f a k ey includes the choice of h. Typically a key will have t w o parts, one being some short string and the other being h, so that formally K = ; h . For example, may be a prime p, to specify that we are working over Z p . We treat them di erently in the notation, writing F h for the function FK;. This is to indicate that although both and h are public, they are accessed di erently: everyone has the complete string , but to h only oracle access is provided. It is to be understood in what follows that the families we discuss might i n v olve a random oracle treated in this way, and when the key is chosen at random the oracle is speci ed too.
We provide in Appendix E a discussion of what security in this random oracle paradigm can guarantee and not guarantee. For yet more information the reader is referred to BR .
We want hash functions that compress their data. A typical desired choice is that DomF = f 0 ; 1 g and RangeF is some nite set, for example f0; 1g k for some integer k. But other choices are possible too.
Collision-resistance. A collision for FK; is a pair of strings x; y 2 DomF such that x 6 = y but FK;x = FK;y. When DomF is larger than RangeF , each FK; will have many collisions. What we want, however, is that these are di cult to nd. To formalize this, say a collision-nder is an algorithm C that given a key K 2 KeysF tries to output a collision for FK;. When K includes a random oracle, this of course means the collision-nder gets oracle access to this same random oracle. We are interested in the probability that it is successful. This probability depends on the time t that is allowed C. For convenience the time" is the actual running time, on some xed RAM model of computation, plus the size of the description of the algorithm C. In general we w ould also measure the amount of memory used, but for simplicity w e only measure time. The model of computation is that used in any standard text on algorithms, for example CLR , and we analyze the running time of algorithms in the same way as in any algorithms course. If a random oracle h is present, we consider the numberof h-computations formally, the number of oracle queries as a separate resource of the collision-nder, and denote it by q. In this case we h a v e the following.
De nition 2.1 We say that collision-nder C t; q; -breaks a hash family F if given a k ey K it runs in time t, makes at most q oracle queries, and nds a collision in FK; with probability a t least . We s a y that F is t; q; -collision-free if there is no collision-nder which t; q; -breaks F. The probability a b o v e i s o v er the choice of the key K from KeysF which includes the choice of the random oracle h and the coins of C. If the random oracle is not present, we simply drop the q", and have t; -breaking and t; -security.
Incrementality
We follow BGG1 . Suppose we have computed the hash value y = FK;x of a message x = x 1 : : : x n . Now x is modi ed: block i is replaced by a new block x 0 i . We want to update y to y 0 = FK;x 0 , where x 0 is the message resulting from replacing block i of x by x 0 i . We want to do it in some way faster than re-computing FK;x 0 from scratch. The job will be done by an incremental algorithm. It takes as input K; x; y; i; x 0 i and outputs y 0 . Ideally it runs in time that is independent of the number of blocks in the messages.
Classes of groups
We will consider groups in which computational problem example, computing discrete logarithms or solving weighted knapsacks is hard. Formally, w e m ust treat families classes of groups. Classes of groups. Formally, a class of groups is some nite collection of groups such that given a description hGi of a group from the class, one can compute all the group operations. Also, there is some distribution on G according to which w e can draw a description of a group. Finally we assume a representation of group elements under which a n y group element o f a n y group is a L-bit string for some L, meaning G f0; 1g L for all G 2 G. This L is called the output length. For example G = f Z p : p is prime and jpj = k g, for some large enough k, is a class of groups. Here hGi = p is the prime describing a particular group, and it is drawn at random from all k-bit primes.
The output length is L = k.
Timing. In the security analyses we need to estimate running times of the algorithms in the reductions. The timing estimates depend on the groups. Accordingly given a class of groups G we let T rand G; T m ult G; T exp G denote, respectively, the time to pick a random element of G, the time to multiply two elements in G and the time to do an exponentiation in G, for G 2 G .
The balance problem in a group
For the purpose of analyzing the security of our hash functions we i n troduce a new computational problem, called the balance problem in a group. Lemma 3.1 will relate the security of our hash function to the assumed hardness of this problem. Our task will then be reduced to nding groups with a hard balance problem. Typically we will do this by further reducing the balance problem to a conventional hard problem like discrete log nding or weighted subset sum. Here we de ne the balance problem.
Let G be some family of groups and n an integer. In the G; n -balance problem we are given the description hGi of a group G 2 G and a sequence a 1 ; : : : ; a n of elements of G. We must nd weights w 1 ; : : : ; w n 2 f , 1 ; 0 ; +1g not all zero, such that a w 1 1 a w n n = e where is the group operation and e is the identity element in the group. 2 Notice that if the group is abelian, this is equivalent t o s a ying we are asked to nd two disjoint subsets I ; J f 1 ; : : : ; n g , not both empty, such that J i2I a i = J j2J a j . We say that the G; n -balance problem is t; -hard if no algorithm, limited to run in time t, can nd a solution to an instance G; a 1 ; : : : ; a n of the problem with probability more than , the probability computed over a random choice of G from G, a choice of a 1 ; : : : ; a n selected uniformly and independently at random in G, and the coins of the algorithm.
The Paradigm
We suggest a new paradigm for the construction of collision-free hash functions.
The Construction
The construction is depicted in Figure 1 . We x a block size b and let B = f0; 1g b . Think of the input x = x 1 : : : x n as a sequence of blocks, meaning x i 2 B for each i = 1 ; : : : ; n . Let N be larger than the numberof blocks in any message we plan to hash, and let l = l g N + b . W e are given a set G on which some operation, which we call the combining operation and denote by , has been de ned. The operation is at the very least associative, but, as we will see later, we prefer it beafull-edged group operation. We are also given a function h: f0; 1g l ! G which w e call the randomizer or compression function. Now what we do is:
1. For each block i = 1 ; : : : ; n , concatenate a lgN-bit binary encoding hii of the block index i to the block content x i to get an augmented block x 0 i = hii : x i 2. For each i = 1 ; : : : ; n , apply h to x 0 i to get a hash value y i = hx 0 i 3. Combine y 1 ; : : : ; y n via the combining operation to get the nal hash value y = y 1 y 2 y n .
More succinctly we can write the function as HASH h hGi x 1 : : : x n = J n i =1 hhii : x i ; 1 where hGi denotes some indication of the group G which enables computation of the group operation. For example if G = Z p then hGi = p. We call this the randomize then combine construction.
Notice that padding the blocks with a representation of their indexes before applying h is important for security. Without this, re-ordering of the blocks in a message would leave the hash value unchanged, leading to collisions.
The hash family. Equation 1 speci es an individual function, depending on the group G. Formally, w e actually have a family of hash functions, because we will want to draw G from some class of groups for which some computational problem example, computing discrete logarithms or solving weighted knapsacks is hard.
Let G be a class of groups, as de ned in Section 2. 
Incrementality and parallelizability
Since the combining operation is associative, the computation is parallelizable. In order to get an incremental hash function we will work in a commutative group, so that is also commutative and invertible. In such a case, increments are done as follows. If block x i changes to x 0 i then the new hash is y hhii : x i , 1 h h i i : x 0 i where ,1 denotes the inverse operation in the group and y is the old hash, namely the hash of x.
Choosing the randomizer
For security the randomizer h must de nitely be collision-free: it is easy to see that the entire construction fails to be collision-free otherwise. In practice h is derived from a standard hash function. We suggest that the derivation be keyed. For example, hx 0 = H : x 0 : where is a random string viewed as part of the key specifying the hash function and Hy is an apprporiate length pre x of SHA-10 : y : SHA-11 : y : : : . In the analyses, we in fact assume much more, namely that it is an ideal" hash function or random oracle BR . Its computation is assumed fast.
Choosing the Combining Operation
Making the right c hoice of combining operation is crucial for security and e ciency.
Combining by XORing doesn't work. Ideally, w e w ould like to hash using only conventional" cryptography. Ie. no number theory. A natural thought t o w ards this end is to set the combining operation to bitwise XOR. But this choice is insecure. Let us look at this a bit more closely.
Let G = f0; 1g k for some xed length k, like k = 128. If we set the combining operation to bitwise XOR, denoted , the resulting function is XHASH h x 1 : : : x n = L n i =1 hhii :
The incrementality is particularly e cient in this case since it takes just a couple of XORs. The question is whether XHASH h is collision-free. At rst glance, it may seem so. However XHASH is in fact not collision-free. Indeed, it is not even one-way. One-wayness is necessary, but not su cient, for collision-resistance. The attack is interesting, and may be useful in other contexts, so we present it in Appendix A. Given a string z 2 f 0 ; 1 g k w e show there how to nd a message x = x 1 : : : x n such that XHASH h x = z. The attack succeeds with probability at least 1=2, the probability being over the choice of h, and works for n k + 1. The attack makes 2n hcomputations, sets up a certain linear system, and then uses Gaussian elimination to solve it. The proof that it works exploits pairwise independence arguments.
Other combining operations. Thus we see that the choice of combining operation is important, and the most tempting choice, XOR, doesn't work. We are loth to abandon the paradigm based on this: it is hard to imagine any other paradigm that yields incrementality. But we conclude that it may be hard to get security using only conventional cryptography to implement the combining operation. So we turn to arithmetic operations. We consider two: multiplication in a group where the discrete logarithm problem is hard, and addition modulo an integer of appropriate size. It turns out they work. But we need to be careful about security given the experience with XOR.
To this end, we begin below b y relating the security of the hash function to the balance problem in the underlying group. A reader interested more in the constructions should skip to Section 4.
Truncating
If the output of our hash function which is an element o f G is too long, then optionally we might hash it to a shorter length by applying a standard collision-free hash function such as SHA-1. The resulting hash function will remain collision-free, and computable in parallel, but note it will no longer be incremental. Thus, this option is only useful if incrementality is not needed.
The balance lemma
The security of the hash functions obtained from our paradigm can be related to the balance problem in the underlying class of groups, as de ned in Section 2.4. Speci cally, in order to prove the security of a particular hash function family HASHG; b , it will be su cient to show that the balance problem associated with the corresponding group family is hard. To understand the theorem below, it may be helpful to refer to the de nitions in Section 2. Recall that q refers to the number of computations of h and the theorem assumes h is ideal, ie. a random function of f0; 1g l to G. The theorem says that if the balance problem is hard over G then the corresponding family of hash functions is collision-free. Moreover it tells us precisely how the parameters describing the security in the two cases relate to each other. Below c 1 is a small constant, depending on the model of computation, which can be derived from the proof.
Lemma 3.1 Let G and q be such that the G; q -balance problem is t 0 ; 0 -hard. Then HASHG; b is a t; q; -collision-free family of hash functions where = 0 and t = t 0 =c , q b. Proof: We are given a collision-nder C, which takes hGi and an oracle for h, and eventually outputs a pair of distinct strings, x = x 1 : : : x n and y = y 1 : : : y m , such that HASH h hGi x = HASH h hGi y. We want to construct an algorithm K that solves the G; q -balance problem. It takes as input hGi and a list of values a 1 ; : : : ; a q selected uniformly at random in G. K runs C on input hGi, answering its oracle queries with the values a 1 ; a 2 ; : : : ; a q in order. We assume oracle queries are not repeated. Notice the answers to oracle queries are uniformly and independently distributed over G, as they would be if h: f0; 1g l ! G were a random function. We will let Q i denote the i-th oracle query of C, namely the one answered by a i , so that hQ i = a i , and we let Q = fQ 1 ; : : : ; Q q g . Finally, C outputs two strings x = x 1 : : : x n and y = y 1 : : : y m , such that x 6 = y but HASH h hGi x = HASH h hGi y. We know this means hh1i : x 1 : : : h h n i : x n = h h 1 i : y 1 : : : h h m i : y m ; 2 the operations being in G. Note that the strings x and y are not necessarily of the same size; that is, m may not beequal to n. We will construct a solution to the balance problem from x and y. Let x 0 i = hii : x i for i = 1; : : : ; n and y 0 i = hii : y i for i = 1; : : : ; m . W e can assume wlog that x 0 1 ; : : : ; x 0 n ; y 0 1 ; : : : ; y 0 m 2 Q . W e let f x i bethe unique value j 2 q such that x 0 i = q j and we let f y i bethe unique j 2 q such that y 0 i = q j . We then let I = f f x i : i = 1; : : : ; n g and J = f f y i : i = 1 ; : : : ; m g be,respectively, the indices of queries corresponding to x and y. a w= e . The probability that we nd a solution to the balance problem is exactly that with which C outputs a collision, and the time estimates can be checked.
MuHASH: The Multiplicative Hash
Here we present our rst concrete construction, the multiplicative hash function MuHASH, and analyze its e ciency and security.
Construction and e ciency
We set the combining operation in our paradigm to multiplication in a group where the discrete logarithm problem is hard. For example G = Z p for an appropriate prime p, or some subgroup thereof. To emphasize multiplication, we call the function MuHASH rather than the general HASH of Section 3. So the function is MuHASH h hGi x 1 : : : x n = Q n i =1 hhii :
The product is taken in the group G over which we are working. where the message is hashed before signing. For RSA we want a string in Z N where N is the modulus, and this may be1024 bits. In other cases, we may want a smaller hash value, say 160 bits. In such cases, we allow a nal application of a standard collision-free hash function to the above output. For example, apply SHA-1 to MuHASH h hGi x and get a 160 bit string. Computing our hash function takes one multiplication perblock, ie. one multiplication perb bits of input. This is in contrast to previous methods which required one multiplication per bit.
To minimize the cost, one can increase the block size. The increment operation is performed as per Section 3.2, and takes one inverse and two multiplication operations in the group, plus two applications of h. Thus it is cheap compared to re-computing the hash function.
Note that the computation of MuHASH h hGi is entirely parallelizable. The applications of h on the augmented blocks can be done in parallel, and the multiplications can also be done in parallel, for example via a tree. This is useful when we h a v e hardware for the group operation, as well might be the case.
The discrete logarithm problem
The security of MuHASH depends on the discrete logarithm problem in the underlying group. Let us begin by de ning it.
Let G be a class of groups, for example G = f Z p : p is a prime with jpj = k g. Let G 2 G , g a generator of G, and y 2 G. A discrete log nder is an algorithm I that takes g;y;hGiand tries to output log g y. Its success probability is taken over a random choice of G from G for the example G above, this means we choose a random k-bit prime p and a random choice of y 2 G. We say that the discrete logarithm problem in G is t 0 ; 0 -hard if any discrete logarithm nder that runs in time t 0 has success probability at most 0 .
Security of MuHASH
The attack on XHASH we saw above indicates that we should be careful about security. Moving from XOR to multiplication as the combining" operation kills that attack in the case of MuHASH. Are there other attacks?
We indicate there are not in a very strong way. We show that as long as the discrete logarithm problem in G is hard and h is ideal, MuHASH h hGi is collision-free. That is, we show that if there is any attack that nds collisions in MuHASH h hGi then there is a way t o e ciently compute discrete logarithms in G. This proven security obviates us from the need to consider the e ects of any speci c attacks.
At rst glance this relation of the security of MuHASH to the discrete logarithm problem in G may seem surprising. Indeed, the description of MuHASH h hGi makes no mention of a generator g, nor is there even any exponentiation: we are just multiplying group elements. Our proofs illustrate how the relationship is made.
We look rst at general groups, then, to get better quantitative results ie. better reductions we look at special classes of groups. Approach. All our proofs have the same structure. First it is shown that if the discrete log problem is hard in G then also the balance problem is hard in G. The security of the hash function is then derived from Lemma 3.1. The main technical question is thus relating the balance and discrete logarithm problems in groups.
Notice this is a question just about computational problems in groups: it has nothing to do with our hash functions. Accordingly, we have separated the materiel on this subject, putting it in Appendix B. There we prove a sequence of lemmas, showing how the quality of the reduction changes with the group. These lemmas could be of independent i n terest. We n o w proceed to apply these lemmas to derive the security of MuHASH for various groups. Security in general groups. The following theorem says that the only way to nd collisions in MuHASH assuming h is ideal is to solve the discrete logarithm problem in the underlying group. The result holds for any class of groups with hard discrete logarithm problem. Refer to Sections 4.1, 4.2 and 2.3 for notation. Below c 1 is a small constant, depending on the model of computation, which can be derived from the proof.
Theorem 4.1 Let G beaclass of groups with output length L. Assume the discrete logarithm problem in G is t 0 ; 0 -hard. Then for any q, MuHASHG; b is a t; q; -collision-free family of hash functions, where = q 0 and t = t 0 =c , q T rand G + T exp G + L + b . Proof: Follows from Lemma 3.1 and Lemma B.1.
In the above reduction, if the probability one can compute discrete logarithms is 0 then the probability of breaking the hash function may be as high as = q 0 . A typical choice of q is about 2 50 . This means the discrete logarithm problem in G must be very hard in order to make nding collisions in the hash function quite hard. To make appreciably small, we must make 0 very small, meaning we m ust use a larger value of the security parameter, meaning it takes longer to do multiplications and the hash function is less e cient. It is preferable to have a stronger reduction in which is closer to 0 . And we w ant to do this while maintaining the running time t 0 of the discrete logarithm nder to be within an additive amount of the running time t of the collision-nder, as it is above. Reducing the error by repetition does not solve our problem.
We now present better reductions. They exploit the group structure to some extent. We look rst at groups of prime order where we have an essentially optimal reduction, then at multiplicative groups modulo a prime where we do a little worse, but still very well, and much better than the naive reduction above.
Security in groups of prime order. The recommended group G in which to implement MuHASH h hGi is a group of prime order. For example, pick a large prime p of the form p = 2 p 0 + 1 where p 0 is also prime, and let G be a subgroup of order p 0 in Z p . The order of Z p is p , 1 which i s not prime, but the order of G is p 0 which is prime. The reason is that the reduction is tight here. As usual c 1 is a small constant, depending on the model of computation, which can be derived from the proof.
Theorem 4.2 Let G be a class of groups of prime order with output length L. Assume the discrete logarithm problem in G is t 0 ; 0 -hard. Then for any q, MuHASHG; b is a t; q; -collision-free family of hash functions, where = 2 0 and t = t 0 =c,q T rand G + T m ult G + T exp G + L + b , L 2 . Proof: Follows from Lemma 3.1 and Lemma B.2.
The form of the theorem statement here is the same as in Theorem 4.1, but this time the probability of breaking the hash function is no more than twice the probability 0 of computing discrete logarithms, for an attacker who runs in time which is comparable in the two cases.
Security in Z p . The most popular group in which t o w ork is probably Z p for a prime p. Since its order is p , 1 which is not prime, the above theorem does not apply. What we can show is that an analogous statement holds. The probability of breaking the hash function may n o w be a little more than the probability 0 of computing discrete logarithms, but only by a small factor which is logarithmic in the size k of the prime p. As usual c 1 is a small constant, depending on the model of computation, which can be derived from the proof.
Theorem 4.3 Let k 6 and let G = f Z p : p is a prime with jpj = k g. Suppose the discrete logarithm problem in G is t 0 ; 0 -hard. Then for any q, MuHASHG; b is a t; q; -collision-free family of hash functions, where = 4 l n 0:694k 0 and t = t 0 =c , qk 3 ,qb. Proof: Follows from Lemma 3.1 and Lemma B.3.
The factor multiplying 0 will not be too large: for example if k = 512 it is about 24. Security in Practice. We have shown that computation of discrete logarithms is necessary to break MuHASH as long as h is ideal. Yet, it could be that MuHASH is even stronger. The reason is that even computation of discrete logarithms does not seem su cient to nd collisions in MuHASH. That is, we suspect that nding collisions in MuHASH h hGi remains hard even if we can compute discrete logarithms. In particular, we know of no attacks that nd collisions in MuHASH even if discrete logarithm computation is easy. In this light it may beworth noting that the natural attempt at a discrete logarithm computation based attack is to try to reduce" the problem to nding additive collisions in the exponents and then apply the techniques of Section A. But this does not work. See Appendix C for more details. The underlying problem is a kind of knapsack problem which is probably hard. In fact this suggests that the hash function obtained by setting the combining operation in our paradigm to addition might be already collision-free. This function and its security are discussed in Section 5.
Some evidence that breaking MuHASH is harder than computing discrete logarithms comes from the results of IN2 who indicate that multiplication in G is a one-way hash as long as any homomorphism with image G is hard. We can extend their proofs, with added conditions, to our setting. This indicates that unless all such homomorphisms are invertible via discrete logarithm computation, MuHASH will be collision-free.
Also, although the proofs make v ery strong assumptions about the function h, i t w ould appear that in practice, the main thing is that h is collision-free. In particular if h is set to SHA-1 then given the modular arithmetic being done on top of the h applications, it is hard to see how to attack the function.
AdHASH: Hashing by Adding
AdHASH is the function obtained by setting the combining operation in our paradigm to addition modulo a su ciently large integer. Let us give the de nition more precisely and then go on to look at security.
Construction and E ciency
We let M beak-bit integer. As usual let x = x 1 : : : x n be the data to be hashed, let b denote the block size, let N be such that all messages we will hash have length at most N and let l = b+lgN.
We let h: f0; 1g l ! Z M be a hash function, assumed ideal. The function is AdHASH h M x 1 : : : x n = P n i =1 hhii : x i mod M :
Thus, the key" of the function is the integer M. We let AdHASHk;b denote the corresponding family, consisting of the functions AdHASH h M as M ranges over all k-bit integers and h ranges over all functions of f0; 1g l to Z M . The distribution on the key space is uniform, meaning we draw M at random from all k-bit integers and h at random from all functions of f0; 1g l to Z M , in order to de ne a particular hash function from the family. AdHASH is much faster than MuHASH since we are only adding, not multiplying. Furthermore, it would seem k can be quite small, like a few hundred, as compared to the sizes we need for MuHASH to make sure the discrete logarithm problem is hard, making the gain in e ciency even greater. In fact the speed of AdHASH starts approaching that of standard hash functions. And of course it is incremental, with the cost of incrementality also now reduced to just adding and subtracting. Thus it is a very tempting function to use. Next we look at security.
Standard and weighted subset sum problems
The security of AdHASH can be related to the di culty of certain modular subset-sum or knapsack type problems which w e n o w de ne.
Standard modular knapsack. In the k;q-knapsack problem we are given a k-bit integer M, and q numbers a 1 ; : : : ; a q 2 Z M . W e m ust nd weights w 1 ; : : : ; w q 2 f 0 ; 1 g , not all zero, such that P q i=1 w i a i 0 mod M :
In other words, we are being asked to nd a non-empty subset I f1; : : : ; q g such that P i2I a i is 0 modulo M. We want to assume this task is hard. The assumption is that this is true when M and a 1 ; : : : ; a q are random. Formally, we say that the k;q-knapsack problem is t 0 ; 0 -hard if no algorithm, limited to run in time t 0 , can nd a solution to an instance M;a 1 ; : : : ; a q of the k;q-knapsack problem with probability more than 0 , the probability computed over a random choice of k-bit integer M, a choice of a 1 ; : : : ; a q selected uniformly and independently at random in Z M , and the coins of the algorithm.
This hardness assumption is essentially the same as Impagliazzo and Naor's assumption that the subset sum function is one-way IN1, IN2 .
We must be careful how w e c hoose the parameters: it is well known that for certain values of k and q, the problem is not hard. We m ust avoid these values. Speci cally, w e will make sure that log q k q . It turns out this choice will not be a restriction for us anyway. Nice discussions of what is known are available in Od and IN2, Section 1.2 , and the reader is referred there for more information. This assumption will su ce to show that AdHASH is a universal one-way hash function cf. Appendix D. In order to show collision-freeness we make a stronger assumption.
Weighted knapsack problem. In the k;q-weighted-knapsack problem we are given a k-bit integer M, and q numbers a 1 ; : : : ; a q 2 Z M . W e m ust nd weights w 1 ; : : : ; w q 2 f , 1 ; 0 ; +1g, not all zero, such that P q i=1 w i a i 0 mod M Thus the di erence is that now a weight is allowed to take on the value ,1. We say that the k;q-weighted-knapsack problem is t 0 ; 0 -hard if no algorithm, limited to run in time t 0 , can nd a solution to an instance M;a 1 ; : : : ; a q of the k;q-weighted-knapsack problem with probability more than 0 , the probability computed over a random choice of k-bit integer M, a choice of a 1 ; : : : ; a q selected uniformly and independently at random in Z M , and the coins of the algorithm.
Notice this is just the G; q -balance problem for the class of groups G = f Z M : jMj = k g.
But it is worth re-stating it for this case.
The hardness of the weighted problem is a stronger assumption than the hardness of the standard problem, but beyond that the relation between the problems is not known. However, there is important evidence about the hardness of the weighted knapsack problems that we discuss next. Relation to lattice problems. A well-known hard problem is to approximate the length of the shortest vector in a lattice. The best known polynomial time algorithms LLL, SH achieve only an exponential approximation factor. It has been suggested that there is no polynomial time algorithm which a c hieves a polynomial approximation factor. Under this assumption, Ajtai showed that both the standard and the weighted subset-sum problems are hard Aj . Actually he allows any small integer weights, not just ,1; 0; +1 like we do. That is, there is no polynomial time algorithm to solve these problems. This is important evidence in favor of both the knapsack assumptions discussed above. As long as approximating the length of a shortest lattice vector is hard, even in the worst case, the knapsack problems are hard. This increases the con dence we can have in cryptosystems based on these knapsack assumptions.
Values of t 0 ; 0 for which the standard and weighted knapsack problems are t 0 ; 0 -hard can be derived from Ajtai's proof, as a function of the concrete parameters for which one assumes shortest vector length approximation is hard. Since Ajtai's proof is quite complex we do not know exactly what the relation is.
We note however that even more is true. Even if the assumption about lattices fails meaning an e cient approximation algorithm for the shortest lattice vector problem emerges, the knapsack problems may still be hard. Thus, we present all our results in terms of the knapsack assumptions.
Security of AdHASH
We relate the collision-freeness of AdHASH to the weighted knapsack problem. Below c 1 is a small constant, depending on the model of computation, which can be derived from the proof.
Theorem 5.1 Let k and q beintegers such that the k;q-weighted-knapsack problem is t 0 ; 0 -hard. Then AdHASHk;b is a t; q; -collision-free family of hash functions where = 0 and t = t 0 =c , qM. Proof: Follows from Lemma 3.1 and the observation that weighted knapsack is a particular case of the balance problem, as mentioned in Section 5.2.
Incremental Hashing via Lattice Problems
Ajtai introduced a function which he showed was one-way if the problem of approximating the shortest vector in a lattice to polynomial factors is hard Aj . Goldreich, Goldwasser and Halevi observed that Ajtai's main lemma could be applied to show that the same function is in fact collisionfree GGH . Here we observe this hash function is incremental, and consider its practicality. We then use our paradigm to derive a more practical version of this function whose security is based on the same assumption as in Aj, GGH plus the assumption that our h is ideal. Let us begin by recalling the problem shown hard by Ajtai's main lemma.
The Matrix Kernel Problem
In the k; n; s-matrix-kernel problem we are given p; M where p is an s-bit integer and M is a k by n matrix with entries in Z p . We must nd a non-zero n-vector w with entries in f,1; 0; +1g such that M w = 0 m o d p . The operation here is matrix-vector multiplication, with the operations done modulo p. We say this problem is t 0 ; 0 -hard if no algorithm, limited to run in time t 0 , can nd a solution to an instance p; M of the k; n; s-matrix-kernel problem with probability more than 0 , the probability computed over a random choice of p, a random choice of matrix M, and the coins of the algorithm.
Suppose k s n 2 s = 2k 4 . Ajtai showed that with these parameters the matrix-kernel problem is hard under the assumption that there is no polynomial time algorithm to approximate the length of a shortest vector in a lattice within a polynomial factor. Ajtai's result was actually stronger, since he allowed entries in w to be any i n tegers of small" absolute value. However GGH observed that weights of ,1; 0; +1 are what is important in the context of hashing and we restrict our attention to these.
A close examination of Ajtai's proof will reveal speci c values of t 0 ; 0 for which w e can assume the matrix kernel problem is t 0 ; 0 -hard, as a function of the assumed hardness of the shortest vector approximation problem. Since the proof is quite complex we don't know what exactly these values are.
Notice that the matrix kernel problem is just an instance of our general balance problem: it is the G; n -balance problem for G = f Z k p : jpj = s g. This shows how the balance problem uni es so many hash functions.
The Ajtai-GGH Function
The function. Let M bearandom k by n matrix with entries in Z p and let x bean n vector with entries in f0; 1g. The function of Aj, GGH is H M;p x = M x mod p : Note M x mod p is a k-vector over Z p , meaning it is k lgp bits long. Since the parameters must obey the restriction k lgp n p = 2k 4 , the function is compressing: the length n of the input x is more than the length k logp of the output M x mod p. Thus it is a hash function. Now, if the matrix kernel problem is hard this function is one-way Aj . Moreover, under the same assumption it is collision-free GGH . It follows from Aj that the function is collision-free as long as shortest vector approximation is hard.
Incrementality. We observe the above function is incremental. Let M i denote the i-th column of M, for i = 1 ; : : : ; n . This is a k-vector over Z p . Let x = x 1 : : : x n with x i 2 f 0 ; 1 g for i = 1 ; : : : ; n . Now w e can write the function as
In other words, we are summing a subset of the columns, namely those corresponding to bits of x that are 1. Now suppose bit x i changes to x 0 i . If y a k-vector over Z p is the old hash value then the new hash value is y + x 0 i , x i M i mod p. Computing this takes k additions modulo p, o r O k logp time, a time which does not depend on the length n of x. Drawbacks of this function. A serious drawback o f H is that the description of the function is very large: nk + 1 l g p bits. In particular, the description size of the function grows with the number of bits to be hashed. This means we m ust set an a priori limit on the number of bits to be hashed and use a function of size proportional to this. This is not feasible in practice.
One way to partially overcome this problem is to specify the matrix entries via an ideal hash function. For example if h: k n ! Z p is such a function, set M i; j = h i; j. But we can do better. The function we describe next not only has small key size and no limit on input length, but is also more e cient. 3
LtHASH
Our function is called LtHASH for lattice based hash."
The construction. We apply the randomize-then-combine paradigm with the group G set to Z k p . That is, as usual let x = x 1 : : : x n bethe data to behashed, let b denote the block size, let N besuch that all messages we will hash have length at most N and let l = b + lgN. We let h: f0; 1g l ! Z k p be a hash function, assumed ideal. Think of its output as a k-entry column vector over Z p . Our hash function is LtHASH h p x 1 : : : x n = P n i =1 hhii : x i mod p : 3 Another way to reduce the key size is de ne HM;P only on relatively short data, and then, viewing it as a compression function, apply Damg ard's iteration method Da2 . But then incrementality is lost. Also, the key sizes, although no longer proportional to the data length, are still larger than for the construction we will describe.
Namely, each application of h yields a column vector, and these are added, componentwise modulo p, to get a nal column vector which is the hash value.
Notice that there is no longer any matrix M in the function description. This is why the key size is small: the key is just the s-bit integer p. Also LtHASH h p is more e cient than the function described above because it does one vector addition per b-bit input block rather than per input bit, and b can be made large.
We let LtHASHk; s; b denote the corresponding family, consisting of the functions LtHASH h p as p ranges over s-bit integers and h ranges over all functions of f0; 1g l to Z k p . The key de ning any particular function is the integer p, and the distribution on the key space is uniform, meaning we draw p at random from all s-bit integers in order to de ne a particular hash function from the family.
Notice that AdHASH is the special case of LtHASH in which k = 1 and p = M.
Security. We relate the collision-freeness of LtHASH to the hardness of the matrix-kernel problem. The relation may not be evident a priori because LtHASH does not explicitly involve any matrix. But, intuitively, there is an implicit" k by q matrix M being de ned, where q is the number of oracle queries allowed to the collision-nder. This matrix is not xed:" it depends on the input. But nding collisions in LtHASH h p relates to solving the matrix kernel problem for this matrix. Below c 1 is a small constant, depending on the model of computation, which can be derived from the proof.
Theorem 6.1 Let k;q;sbeintegers such that the k;q;s-matrix-kernel problem is t 0 ; 0 -hard. Then LtHASHk; s; b is a t; q; -collision-free family of hash functions where = 0 and t = t 0 =c , qks. Proof: Follows from Lemma 3.1 and the observation, made in Section 6.1, that the matrix kernel problem is a particular case of the balance problem when the group is Z k p .
We will choose the parameters so that k s q 2 s = 2k 4 . Recall s = jpj. In this case, we know that the required matrix kernel problem is hard as long as shortest lattice vector approximation is hard.
To actually implement the function we must have some idea of what values to assign to the various security parameters. Opinions as to the concrete complexity of the shortest lattice vector approximation problem vary across the community: it is not clear how high must be the dimension of the lattice to get a speci c desired security level. Although the best known algorithm for shortest vector approximation is only proven to achieve an exponential factor LLL , its in practice performance is often much better. And Schnorr and H orner SH have found heuristics that do better still. In particular, it does not seem clear how big we need take k which corresponds to the dimension of the lattice before we can be sure of security. One must also take i n to account the exact security of the reductions, which are far from tight. Some discussion is in GGH, Section 3 .
Keeping all this in mind let us look at our case. It seems safe to set k = 500. Less will probably su ce. We w ant to allow q, the number of oracle queries, to be quite large, say q = 2 70 . To ensure q 2 s = 2k 4 w e m ust take s about 110. Namely p is 110 bits long. This is longer than what the function of Aj, GGH needs, making operations modulo p slower for LtHASH, but this is compensated for by h a ving much fewer such operations to do, since we can make the block size b large.
Of course LtHASH is still incremental. Incrementing takes one addition and one subtraction over Z k p . Comparison with our other proposals. LtHASH is very similar to AdHASH. In fact it is just AdHASH implemented over a di erent domain, and the security can beproven based on the same underlying problem of hardness of shortest lattice vector approximation. Notice also that AdHASH can be considered a special case of LtHASH, namely, the case k = 1 . However the proof of security of LtHASH does not immediately carry over to AdHASH because the shortest lattice vector problem in dimension k = 1 is easily solved by the Euclidean algorithm. So, the concrete security of LtHASH might be better because the relation to shortest lattice vector approximation is more direct.
Comparison with MuHASH is di cult, depending much on how parameters are set in both functions, but AdHASH and LtHASH are likely to be more e cient, especially because we can make the block size b large.
A Attack on XHASH
In Section 3 we presented XHASH as a plausible candidate for a incremental collision-free hash function but indicated that it was in fact insecure. Here we present the attack showing this. Recall that the function is XHASH h x 1 : : : x n = h h 1 i : x 1 h h n i : x n . Here each x i is a b-bit block, and l = b + l g N is large enough to accommodate the block plus an encoding of its index, by dint of making N larger than the numberof blocks in any message to behashed. Our assumption is that h: f0; 1g l ! f 0 ; 1 g k is ideal, ie. a random function of f0; 1g l to f0; 1g k .
Our claim is that there is an attack that easily nds collisions in XHASH h . We will in fact show something stronger, namely that XHASH h is not even a one-way function. Given any k bit string z, w e can e ciently compute a string x such that XHASH h x = z . To see that this means XHASH h is not collision-free, let z = XHASH h y for some random y and then apply the algorithm to produce x. With high probability x 6 = y so we h a v e a collision.
We reduce the problem to solving linear equations. See Co for other attacks that exploit linear equations.
The attack. Given z 2 f0; 1g k we now show how to nd x so that XHASH h x = z. Fix two messages x 0 = x 0 1 : : : x 0 n and x 1 = x 1 1 : : : x 1 n with the property that x 0 i 6 = x 1 i for all i = 1 ; : : : ; n . We will see later how t o s e t n . In fact n = k + 1 will su ce. For any n-bit string y = y 1 : : : y n w e let x y = x y 1 1 : : : x y n n . W e claim that we can nd a y such that XHASH h x y = z . Let us rst say how to nd such a y , then see why the method works. T o solve this, we turn it into a system of equations over GF2. We rst introduce new variables y 1 ; : : : ; y n . We will force y i = 1 , y i . Then we turn the above i n to k equations, one for each bit. The resulting system is:
y i y i = 1 i = 1 ; : : : ; n L n i =1 0 i j y i 1 i j y i =z j j= 1 ; : : : ; k Here we have n + k equations in 2n unknowns, over the eld GF2. Below we show that if n = k + 1 then there exists a solution with probability 1 = 2. We n o w set n = k + 1 and solve the set of equations, for example via Gaussian elimination, to get values for y 1 ; : : : ; y n 2 GF2. The system is slightly under-determined in that there are n + k = 2k + 1 equations in 2n = 2k + 2 unknowns. It can be solved by setting one unknown arbitrarily. This completes the description of the attack. Now w e h a v e to see why i t w orks.
Analysis. There are two main claims. The rst is that a solution y to the above does exist with reasonable probability as long as n is su ciently large. The second is that given that some y exists, the algorithm nds such a y . The latter is clear from the procedure, so we concentrate on the rst. The following lemma implies that with n = k + 1 a solution exists with probability at least one-half.
Lemma A.1 Fix z 2 f 0 ; 1 g k . Fix two messages x 0 = x 0 1 : : : x 0 n and x 1 = x 1 1 : : : x 1 n with the property that x 0 i 6 = x 1 i for all i = 1 ; : : : ; n . F or any n-bit string y = y 1 : : : y n let x y = x y 1 1 : : : x y n n . Then Pr 9y 2 f 0 ; 1 g n : XHASH h x y = z 1 , 2 k 2 n : The probability here is over a random choice of h from the set of all functions mapping f0; 1g l ! f0; 1g k . Proof: For y 2 f0; 1g n let X y be the random variable which is 1 if XHASH h x y = z and 0 otherwise. Let X = P y2f0;1g n X y . Now Pr 8y 2 f 0 ; 1 g n : XHASH h x y 6 = z = Pr X = 0 . So we w ant t o s h o w that Pr X = 0 2 k = 2 n . The rst step is to observe the following. Claim. The collection of random variables fX y g y2f0;1g n is pairwise independent. Proof. This follows from the de nition of XHASH h . Suppose y 6 = y 0 . Then there is a point in the set f h i i : x y i i : 1 i n g which is not in the set f h i i : x y 0 i i : 1 i n g . Now assume we know the value of F rom this the claim follows. 2
We also note that XHASH h x y is uniformly distributed over f0; 1g k for each xed y. Thus E X y = 2 , k and E X = 2 n 2 ,k . Since the random variables are pairwise independent, we can apply Chebyshev's inequality to see that Pr X = 0 Pr jX , E X j 2 n , k V ar X 2 2n,k = 2 2k,n P y2f0;1g n Var X y : But Var X y = E X y 1 , E X y E X y = 2 , k so the above i s 2 2k,n 2 n 2 ,k = 2 k = 2 n .
B The balance problem and discrete logs
In this section we show how the intractability of the discrete logarithm in a group implies the intractability of the balance problem in the same group. These are the technical lemmas underlying the theorems on the security of MuHASH presented in Section 4.3.
We stress that the question here is purely about computational problems in groups, having nothing to do with our hash functions. We rst prove a very general, but quantitatively weak result for arbitrary groups. Then we prove strong results for groups of prime order and the group of integers modulo a prime. Refer to Section 2.4 for a de nition of the balance problem and Section 4.2 for a de nition of the discrete logarithm problem. General groups. The following says that if computing discrete logs in some class of groups is hard, then so is the balance problem. As usual c 1 is a small constant, depending on the model of computation, which can be derived from the proof.
Lemma B.1 Let G be a class of groups with output length L. Assume the discrete logarithm problem in G is t 0 ; 0 -hard. Then for any q, the G; q -balance problem is t; -hard, where = q 0 and t = t 0 =c , q T rand G + T exp G + L . Proof: We are given an algorithm A, which takes hGi and a sequence of elements a 1 ; : : : ; a q in G and outputs weights w 1 ; : : : ; w q 2 f , 1 ; 0 ; +1g, not all zero, such that q i=1 a w i i = 1 . Let g bea generator of the group G. We w ant to construct a discrete logarithm nding algorithm I. It takes as input hGi, g, and y 2 G, the last randomly chosen, and returns log g y.
We let = jGj be the order of G. We will use A to build I. I rst picks at random an integer q in the range 1; : : : ; q . I then computes elements a i i = 1 ; : : : ; q as follows. If i = q then a i = y.
Otherwise it chooses at random r i 2 Z and sets a i = g r i . Notice that since y is random and g is a generator, all a i are uniformly distributed over G. Finally, I runs A on input hGi; a 1 ; : : : ; a q and gets a sequence of weights w 1 ; : : : ; w q , not all zero, such that a w 1 1 a w= 1 . Let i be such that w i 6 = 0 . Since the choice of q was random and unknown to A, with probability at least 1=q it will be the case that the q = i . For notational convenience, assume q = i = 1 . Now, substituting, we h a v e y w 1 g w 2 r 2 g w q r q = 1 :
Re-arranging the temrs and noticing that w ,1 1 = w 1 in Z gives us y = g ,w 1 w 2 r 2 ++wqrq m o d Thus, r = ,w 1 w 2 r 2 + + w q r q m o d is the discrete logarithm of y and I can output it and halt. The probability that I is successful is times the probability that w q 6 = 0 , and we saw the latter was at least 1=q. That is, 0 = =q. Since I runs A it incurs time t. Computing each a i takes one random choice and one exponentiation except for a q which only needs to be copied, meaning T rand G + T exp G steps per element. The output of C may be up to t bits long so reading it is another investment of time upto t. The nal modular additions take OqL time. The total time for the algorithm is thus t 0 = t + q T rand G + T exp G + L . This is a very general result, but quantitatively not the best. We now tighten the relationship between the parameters for special classes of groups.
Groups of prime order. Let G besome class of groups of prime order for which the discrete logarithm problem is hard, as discussed in Section 4.3. Below we see that = 2 0 rather than = q 0 as before, which is quite an improvement. As usual c 1 is a small constant, depending on the model of computation, which can be derived from the proof. Lemma B.2 Let G be a class of groups of prime order with output length L. Assume the discrete logarithm problem in G is t 0 ; 0 -hard. Then for any q, the G; q -balance problem is t; -hard, where = 2 0 and t = t 0 =c , q T rand G + T m ult G + T exp G + L , L 2 . Proof: We follow and modify the proof of Lemma B.1. By assumption G has prime order. We let = jGj be this order. So G = f g i : i 2 Z g. Note that computation in the exponents is modulo and takes place in a eld, namely Z . We will make use of this.
Given A we are constructing I. I takes as input hGi, g, and y 2 G, the last randomly chosen.
If y = 1 the 1" here standing for the identity element of G, then I can immediately answer log g y = 0 . So, we can assume that y 6 = 1 . The key point where we di er from the previous proof is in how the input to A is computed. For each i = 1 ; : : : ; q , algorithm I chooses at random r i 2 Z and also chooses at random d i 2 f 0 ; 1 g and sets a i = g d i y r i . Notice that g d i is either 1 or g and we don't need to perform a modular exponentiation to compute it. Notice also that since G has prime order every element of G except 1 is a generator. In particular y is a generator and hence a i is uniformly distributed over G. Now w e continue to follow the proof of Theorem 4. If it is the case that r 6 = 0 then, since is a prime, r has an inverse modulo . I computes the inverse of r modulo and denotes it by r ,1 . I outputs r ,1 d mod . We h a v e g dr ,1 = y rr ,1 =y so the output is indeed log g y. To show the algorithm outputs log g y with the claimed probability 0 , w e just need to observe that the input distribution to A is that required by the balance problem. A solves this problem with probability and we get log g y with probability at least one half of that. Lemma B.3 Let k 6 and let G = f Z p : p is a prime with jpj = k g. Suppose the discrete logarithm problem in G is t 0 ; 0 -hard. Then for any q, the G; q -balance problem is t; -hard, where = 4 l n 0:694k 0 and t = t 0 =c , qk 3 ,b.
The following, which we will use in the proof, can be derived from inequalities in Rosser and Schoenfeld RS . Recall that the function is MuHASH h hGi x 1 : : : x n = Q n i =1 hhii : x i . We will try to set up an attack similar to that on XHASH and use the ability to compute discrete logarithms in G to turn the multiplicative equation associated to MuHASH h hGi x = z into a linear equation. only the values 0 and 1. This is a modular version of the subset sum problem aka knapsack, which is known to beNP-complete GJ . In IN1, IN2 , Impagliazzo and Naor conjecture that equation 7 is hard to solve when jGj = 2 k and n k = l g j G j . Notice that in our case n cannot bemuch smaller than than logjGj if we want equation 7 to have a solution and cannot bemuch bigger than logjGj for e ciency reasons.
Therefore, even assuming that we can compute discrete logarithms in G, it is not clear how collisions in MuHASH h hGi can be found. This does not prove that nding collision in MuHASH h hGi is harder than computing discrete logarithms, as there could be better ways to use discrete logarithms to set up an attack on MuHASH h hGi . However, it suggests that MuHASH h hGi might b e e v en more secure than what we proved.
D AdHASH: Universal One-wayness Universal one-wayness. In this notion of Naor and Yung NY the adversary must rst choose x. Then K, de ning FK;, is chosen, and the adversary must nd y so that x; y is a collision. Formally, a weak collision-nder is a pair of algorithms C 1 ; C 2 . The rst outputs a pair x; where x 2 DomF and is some state information. The second takes K; x; and outputs y. The weak collision-nder is successful if x; y is a collision.
De nition D.1 We s a y that weak collision-nder C 1 ; C 2 t; q; -breaks a hash family H if given oracle h, it runs in time t, makes at most q oracle queries, and nds a collision in H h K with probability at least . We say that H is t; q; -universal-one-way if there is no weak collisionnder which t; q; -breaks H. Again the probability above is over the coins of C 1 ; C 2 , and the later choice of the random oracle h and the key K from KeysH. If the random oracle is not present, we simply drop the q", and have t; -breaking and t; -security. Note since the adversary is not allowed to choose x as a function of K and h, it is a weaker notion of security: if H is collision-free then it is universal one-way, but not necessarily vice-versa.
Notice that, since the random oracle h is part of the de nition of the hash function and the weak collision-nder C 1 ; C 2 m ust output x before knowing H k K , only C 2 is given access to the random oracle and C 1 cannot make queries to h. To make this meaningful when the random oracle" is instantiated, it is important to not just set h to some hash function. Instead, we set it to a keyed hash function, as discussed in Section 3.3. The key is part of the description of the function.
We relate the universal one-wayness of AdHASH to the standard modular knapsack problem.
The constant c in the following depends only on the model of computation.
Theorem D.2 Let k and q beintegers such that the k;q-knapsack problem is t 0 ; 0 -hard. Then AdHASHk;bis a t; q; -universal-one-way family of hash functions where t = t 0 , cq l + k and = 2 0 .
Proof: We are given a weak collision-nder C 1 ; C 2 which t; q; -breaks AdHASHk;b. Algorithm C 1 outputs a pair x; where x = x 1 : : : x n is a string to be hashed and is some state information. Algorithm C 2 takes ; K and an oracle for h, and eventually outputs a string y = y 1 : : : y m , di erent from x, such that AdHASH h M x = AdHASH h M y. We want to construct an algorithm K that solves the k;q-knapsack problem. It takes as input M and a list of values a 1 ; : : : ; a q selected uniformly at random in Z M . K rst runs C 1 and obtains a pair x; . It then runs C 2 on ; M , answering its oracle queries according to one of the two following strategy, c hosen at random.
Strategy one: for i = 1; : : : ; n answer hhii : x i with a number b i chosen uniformly and independently at random in Z M , and answer any other query hhi j i : z j j = 1 ; 2 ; : : : ; q , n with b i j + a j , where b i j = 0 for i j n .
Strategy two: for i = 1; : : : ; n , 1 answer hhii : x i with a i , then answer hhni : x n with P q i=n a i mod M, and nally answer any other query hhi j i : z j j = 1 ; 2 ; : : : ; q , n with a n+j .
We assume oracle queries are not repeated. Notice that in both strategies, the answers to the queries are uniformly and independently distributed over Z M , as it would beif h: f0; 1g l ! Z M were a random function. Finally, C 2 outputs another string y = y 1 : : : y m , such that x 6 = y but AdHASH h M x = AdHASH h M y. Notice that for any i = 1; : : : ; m , it must beeither y i = x i or hii : y i = h i j i : z j for some j. Let J be the set of indices j such that hii : y i = h i j i : z j for some i. Now w e distinguish two cases:
if n m, assume that the rst strategy was chosen. We have AdHASH h M y = P n i =1 b i + P i2J a i = AdHASH h M x + P i 2 J a i . F rom AdHASH h M x = AdHASH h M y and x 6 = y, it follows that P i2J a i = 0 and J 6 = ;, i.e., J is a solution to the given knapsack problem.
if n m , assume that the second strategy was chosen. We have AdHASH h M x = P q i =1 a i
and AdHASH h M y = P i2J 0 a i where J 0 = fj + n: j 2 Jg f 1 ; : : : ; n g n f i j : j 2 J g . Let J 00 = f1; : : : ; q g n J 0 . Since AdHASH h M x = AdHASH h M y and n 6 2 J 0 , w e h a v e P i 2 J 00 a i = 0 and J 00 6 = ;, i.e., J 00 is a solution to the given knapsack problem.
Notice that the two strategy are identical from the viewpoint o f o f C 2 . Therefore K has exactly 1=2 probability t o use a strategy that will enable him to solve the given knapsack problem if C 1 ; C 2 succeeds in nding a collision.
E The Random Oracle Paradigm
It may b e w orth saying a few words about the random oracle paradigm we are using. We take this discussion from BR .
As we h a v e seen, the idea is to use a function h in the schemes, and prove security of the schemes assuming h is a truly random function, or random oracle. Later, in practice, h is set to some xed function, derived from some standard hash function like SHA-1. The schemes typically as here involve other hard functions as well, such a s n umber-theoretic based ones.
It is important to neither over-estimate nor under-estimate what this paradigm buys you in terms of security guarantees. First, one must be clear that this is not standard provable security.
The function h that we actually use in the nal scheme is not random. Thus the question is: what has it bought u s t o h a v e done the proof in the rst place?
The overly skeptical might say the answer is nothing." This is not quite true. Here is one
way to see what it buys. In practice, attacks on schemes involving a SHA-1 derived h and number theory will themselves treat h as random. In other words, cryptanalysis of these mixed" schemes is usually done by assuming h is random. But then the proofs apply, and indeed show that such attacks will fail unless the underlying number-theoretic problems are easy. In other words, the analysis at least provably excludes a certain common class of attacks. Of course this doesn't include all attacks. But what it tells us is that to successfully attack schemes proven secure in a random oracle model, the cryptanalyst must exploit the structure of a speci c hash function h. But when both number-theory and hashing are involved, getting pro table cryptanalytic interaction between h and the number-theory is very hard, because the two problems are so independent" in structure. However this feeling, although it seems to be true, is heuristic. Certainly it relies very much on the idea that the problems are independent.
This explains why the random oracle model is viewed in BR as a bridge between theory and practice."
